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INTRODUCTION 
In 1864, a New York trial court confronted a fairly run-of-the-mill 
entrapment defense.1  The judge, like most judges at the time, 
rejected the defense, admonishing that the great Lawgiver overruled 
such tactics back when Eve complained, “the serpent beguiled me, 
and I did eat.”2  The decades that followed witnessed an 
unprecedented retreat from this lofty precedent.  State and federal 
courts throughout the union began to recognize and elaborate on 
the entrapment defense around the turn of the century.3  In 1932, 
the Supreme Court followed in kind by holding the defense implicit 
in all federal criminal statutes.4  Ever since, entrapment has occupied 
a rather small and uncontroversial corner of criminal law.  Recently, 
however, courts and scholars have struggled to define entrapment in 
the context of increasingly intrusive law enforcement techniques.5 
Analyzed in various ways, the entrapment defense excuses a 
defendant when the actions of government officials produced the 
crime of which he stands charged.  Since its inception, most courts 
have employed a subjective test, asking whether the individual 
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 1 Bd. of Comm’rs of Excise v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864). 
 2 Id. at 33. 
 3 See generally infra PART II (discussing the history of the entrapment defense). 
 4 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
 5 The nature and scope of the entrapment defense has become especially 
controversial in the context of federal efforts to capture criminals using the Internet.  
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1008 
(2001). 
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defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before encouraged 
to do so by some state actor.6  A minority of courts and many 
commentators, however, espouse a test that inquires whether law 
enforcement officials acted in an objectively reasonable way.7  
Entrapment was born in an era when most areas of the law were 
tilting away from subjective tests toward more objective tests.8  This 
article seeks to answer (1) why entrapment emerged when it did and 
(2) why courts stubbornly cling to an outmoded subjective 
entrapment analysis. 
The answer to the first of these questions is, on one level, quite 
simple.  After the Civil War, state governments grew and police forces 
grew with them.  As the federal government expanded, so too did its 
arm of law enforcement.  The people needed protection from this 
law enforcement leviathan and sought this protection in the courts.  
By the end of the century, the machinery of the state had 
transformed so radically that the law could no longer protect 
individuals by securing a boundary around their person and their 
property.  Serving as neutral arbiter between one individual and the 
next proved not only insufficient, but also impossible.  Notions of 
voluntary contractual relations, even stretched to their extreme, 
could not accommodate the modern state with its many tentacles 
reaching into realms of privacy that people never thought could be 
threatened.9  Sting operations conducted by state and federal 
detectives offered a fairly concrete example of how government had 
outgrown its neutral status.  Thus, the state seemed both 
impersonal—in its growingly distant, bureaucratic, and centralized 
form—and, ironically, visible—in officers’ presence in the average 
citizen’s daily life.  Entrapment emerged in response to the conflict 
between these two visions of the state as one of many turn-of-the-
century legal developments that subtly redrew the boundary between 
the individual and the government. 
This brings us to the answer to the second question.  As the law 
of contract, tort, and property all espoused an objective test, the 
space for free will and autonomy in the law diminished, leaving a 
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theoretical vacuum in its wake.  As Morton Horwitz explained, by the 
time the progressive legal thinkers launched their attack on natural 
rights in the 1920s and 30s, the idea that the law could actually 
uncover some real subjective intent and preserve a sacred area of free 
will was already largely discredited.10  The vast and complicated 
nature of modern economic interactions had rendered that ideal 
mythical, at best.11  So, Oliver Wendell Holmes’s reasonable man took 
the place of each individual and policy determined how that 
reasonable man should and would act in any given instance.12  Legal 
historians argue that this set the stage for the law’s turn to the social 
sciences.13  Courts, however, never collapsed into mere brokers for 
different social scientific theories, and the notion that the law can, 
and should, seek to define subjective intent, freedom, and autonomy 
did not disappear.  Rather, it migrated to different areas and took 
different forms.  By uncovering those forms, we begin to catch a 
glimpse of how the law redefined freedom and individuality in 
reaction to the new constellation of economic, social, and political 
forces.14 
Thus, entrapment grew as a response to the increasingly 
pervasive and invasive forms of law enforcement, but it was not an 
inevitable reaction to the sudden expansion in the nature and scope 
of state and federal police power.  Entrapment emerged as a piece of 
a puzzle: an innovative way to police the boundaries between 
government and the individual in the newly drawn precincts of the 
modern state.  I have divided my discussion of the history of 
entrapment law to illustrate this thesis.  Part I of this article briefly 
reviews the social and political context of post-Civil War America and 
elaborates on the changes in law enforcement at the time.  Part II 
discusses the history of both the state and federal defense of 
 
 10 See HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 33-65. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 109-44. 
 13 See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC 
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 13-115 (1973).  In general, the turn to the 
social sciences could not solve the problem of determinism in the law.  Most of the 
social sciences, after all, provided natural or psychological explanations for all 
human behavior.  See H. STUART HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIETY: THE 
REORIENTATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL THOUGHT, 1890-1930, at 4-5 (1977).  The law 
was left to concede or to find a new place for freedom within its doctrine. 
 14 In researching entrapment, I have relied on Michel Foucault’s notion of 
“archaeology.”  Thus, the particular history of entrapment seems to me evidence of a 
significant mutation in the law.  By analyzing the shift in this system of thought, we 
begin to understand the nature of individuality in the twentieth century, something 
that, to the modern eye, might seem inevitable, unquestionable, or necessary.  See 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1972). 
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entrapment.  Part III analyzes some of the implications of this history, 
gives an overview of the current debate over how the defense ought 
to function, and places it in context of the history of entrapment law.  
Finally, without falling too easily into the trap that history, custom, 
and past practice should dictate policy, I will argue that given the 
history of entrapment, a modified subjective test provides the 
appropriate analysis.15  In addition, the history of entrapment 
illustrates how the defense fits into criminal law and counsels against 
extending it to cases where private parties rather than government 
officials entrap an individual. 
I.  HISTORY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Organized state police forces are a relatively modern innovation.  
In the colonial period, citizens bore a collective responsibility for law 
enforcement and every adult male shared a duty to serve as constable 
or hire someone to take his turn.16  As individuals grew increasingly 
wary of such periodic police duties, many towns began to elect 
constables who would hire a number of watchmen, and the powers of 
the police increased gradually.17  These constables had broad 
administrative responsibilities beyond law enforcement.18 
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the police remained loosely 
organized and largely ineffectual.19  Most towns employed one chief 
and a dozen or so patrolmen.20  The towns paid their chief fees for 
certain tasks rather than a salary and the chief, in turn, paid the 
patrolmen.21  In most cases, victims bore the cost of prosecution, and 
 
 15 For a pathbreaking review of the role that history has, and should, play in legal 
thought, see Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995). 
 16 DAVID R. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT: A HISTORY 5-7 (1981).  The 
active involvement of citizens in policing dated back to England in the tenth century 
when each citizen was responsible for neighbors who had been victimized.  This 
informal community model went through various permutations until Oliver 
Cromwell modified the “constabulary” into a mounted cavalry to serve the role of 
police.  See KENNETH J. PEAK, POLICING AMERICA 5-6 (1997).  In 1663, King Charles II 
replaced this force with a night watch and constable system composed primarily of 
old men, commonly called the “Old Charlies.”  GEORGE ASTOR, THE NEW YORK COPS 
10 (1971).  The dominant law enforcement persona in the rural south was the sheriff 
rather than the constable.  See FRANK RICHARD PRASSEL, THE WESTERN PEACE OFFICER: 
A LEGACY OF LAW AND ORDER 94 (1972). 
 17 JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 7. 
 18 Id. at 3. 
 19 ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920, at 42-48 (1981) 
[hereinafter MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA]. 
 20 Id. at 46-49. 
 21 Id. at 61. 
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as a result, police tended to focus on crimes against property, leaving 
many more violent personal crimes unsolved.22 
Law enforcement in the southern colonies was similarly 
haphazard, consisting, in most cases, of a single sheriff who harbored 
a vast number of responsibilities on top of policing.23  Towns in the 
south, however, faced the additional problem of slave insurrections.  
Beginning in the early eighteenth century, southern citizens 
supplemented the nascent police department by serving on “slave 
patrols” designed to retrieve runaway slaves and prevent slave 
revolts.24  Territorial expansion and tensions produced by slavery 
stretched the limits of community policing.  Throughout the rural 
south and the west, wherever sheriffs and slave patrols failed to 
preserve the peace, bands of vigilantes filled the vacuum.25 
The turn of the eighteenth century witnessed unprecedented 
urban growth.  Between 1790 and 1830, due in part to immigration 
from central and northern Europe, as well as mass industrialization 
and migration from rural America, cities almost quadrupled in size.26  
In the decades after 1830, urban centers experienced a population 
boom that would not subside for close to a century.27  Faced with 
increased crime and social tension that accompanied such sudden 
growth and diversity, the larger American cities took their cue from 
across the Atlantic and began to establish more organized 
hierarchical police forces designed primarily to prevent crime by 
constant patrol.28  Boston established the first such police unit in 1844 
and New York followed suit in 1854.29  In the following decades, most 
American cities created similar organizations, but, unlike their British 
 
 22 Id. at 35. 
 23 Brian Vila & Cynthia Morris, The Role of Police in American Society: A 
Documentary History 14-15 (1999). 
 24 Id. at 14-17.  Shortly after its successful struggle for independence, Texas 
established its own police force, called the Texas Rangers, to protect the frontier 
from Mexicans and the Indians.  The Rangers persisted after Texas joined the Union 
in 1845 but they were absorbed into the Confederate army during the war and 
ultimately displaced by the state police instituted during Reconstruction.  When the 
Democrats took power in 1874, they reestablished the Rangers.  PRASSEL, supra note 
16, at 151-54. 
 25 ROBERT M. REGOLI & JOHN D. HEWITT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 221 (1996); see also 
PRASSEL, supra note 16, at 76-78. 
 26 VILA & MORRIS, supra note 23, at 25. 
 27 ERIC H. MONKKONEN, AMERICA BECOMES URBAN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. 
CITIES & TOWNS, 1780-1980, at 70 (1988) [hereinafter MONKKONEN, AMERICA 
BECOMES URBAN]. 
 28 SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF 
PROFESSIONALISM 53-61 (1977). 
 29 JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 26-27. 
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counterpart, the police throughout America remained under 
municipal control throughout the century.30  The decentralized local 
nature of American policing persisted, in part, out of adherence to 
an important theoretical ideal tying the people to the execution of 
their laws.  The European state and national police forces—far 
removed from ordinary citizens—were perceived as uniquely 
undemocratic, quasi-military forces.31  Alexis de Tocqueville 
commented on the decentralized structure of American law 
enforcement, observing that it was nonetheless effective because 
individuals felt that reporting crimes and assisting in law enforcement 
was an integral part of their responsibility as citizens of a democratic 
state.32  What is important is not the accuracy of Tocqueville’s 
somewhat romantic rendition of American law enforcement, but 
rather the theoretical appeal of local, decentralized police to a 
nineteenth-century democratic vision. 
In fact, local police could not possibly accommodate the 
increasingly national scope of criminal syndicates.  Even before the 
Civil War, private detective agencies lent their expertise to assist the 
fledgling municipal police in capturing outlaws like Jesse James and 
Butch Cassidy, whose notorious crimes spanned city and state 
boundaries.33  The most famous of these was the Pinkerton National 
Detective Agency, founded in 1855 by Allan Pinkerton, a Scottish 
immigrant living in Chicago.34  Prior to the Civil War, the agency also 
served as a labor spy service, providing businesses with “spotters” who 
disguised themselves as workers to detect lazy or dishonest 
employees.35  Gaining expertise and national prominence in the Civil 
War, the Pinkertons assisted the Chief of the Secret Service by 
infiltrating the confederate ranks.36  After the war, labor conflict 
reached a heightened pitch.  Employed essentially as spies for the 
state, the Pinkertons used informers and undercover agents to 
undermine union strike efforts and assist the government in labor 
discipline.37  Hired initially by private businesses, the Pinkertons often 
 
 30 VILA & MORRIS, supra note 23, at 26. 
 31 See ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 15-16 (1977). 
 32 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 96 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969). 
 33 WILLIAM J. BOPP & DONALD O. SCHULTZ, PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55-57 (1972). 
 34 Robert P. Weiss, Private Detective Agencies and Labor Discipline in the United States, 
1855-1946, in SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT 357, 358-62 
(Robert P. Weiss ed., 1999). 
 35 Id. at 360. 
 36 Id. at 358. 
 37 Id. at 362.  For a discussion of the role of the Pinkertons in the Homestead 
Strike of 1892, see DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE 
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ended up working with local police and federal officials in staging 
undercover operations.38 
Up until the end of the nineteenth century, police served a far 
broader social role than in our modern conception.  They bore much 
of the burden of social welfare, housing the homeless, and caring for 
the poor during that early period.39  By the 1890s, however, the police 
were engaged less actively in the problems of every-day life.  They 
abandoned care for the homeless and focused almost exclusively on 
crime control.40  Historian Eric Monkkonen argues that this shift 
precipitated a greater distrust, estrangement, and anonymity between 
the city residents and their police.41  During this same period, police 
organization mirrored the decentralized nature of urban American 
politics.  Aldermen or city councilmen nominated police chiefs for 
their own wards.42  Throughout the country the police gradually 
allied with corrupt city politicians and grew increasingly ineffective at 
managing the escalating crime rates.43  This was in part due to the 
steep increase in urban crime, combined with the forces’ poor 
organization and rudimentary equipment.44  But it also resulted from 
a kind of deliberate tolerance, and at times, an outright acceptance 
of vice.45  Ward bosses depended on police to manipulate the polls, 
provide patronage jobs, and grant favors for constituents.  Police 
officers and their supervisors in turn were beholden to politicians for 
their jobs and coveted promotions.46  Officers in New York, for 
example, paid regular fees to Tammany leaders, which they then 
recouped by extorting money from saloons, gambling houses, and 
brothels.47  Thus, city politics operated in the shadow of this uneasy 
alliance between police, politicians, and the underworld.48 
 
WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925, at 37-38 (1993). 
 38 See, e.g., Speiden v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 156 (1877).  Between the years of 
1892 and 1910, the Pinkertons opened fifteen new branch offices, worked 
increasingly with state authorities, and served basically as spies for the state.  See 
Weiss, supra note 34, at 362. 
 39 MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, supra note 19, at 150. 
 40 Id. at 156-57. 
 41 See id. at 157-61. 
 42 WALKER, supra note 28, at 9. 
 43 See FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 1-12. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 JAY STUART BERMAN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM: 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AS POLICE COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK 17-20 (1987). 
 47 See ASTOR, supra note 16, at 57-60. 
 48 See Mark H. Haller, Historical Roots of Police Behavior: Chicago, 1890-1925, in 
POLICE, PRISON, AND PUNISHMENT 323, 330-34 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987); see also 
FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 5-10. 
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Because police depended on revenue from crime just as the 
politicians depended on votes and fees from the police, officers did 
not attempt to suppress crime or vice; they regulated it.49  Police in 
Chicago, for example, facilitated illicit activity by dividing their beats 
between warring gangs of pickpockets.  They staged arrests so that 
angry victims would feel vindicated, and then promptly released the 
culprit for a small fee.50  To further this symbiotic relationship, 
detectives developed a network of informers and maintained 
extensive relationships with the underworld.  As historian Mark 
Haller observed about the Chicago police at the turn of the century, 
“[e]ven conscientious detectives were so involved with the 
underworld that there was only a thin line between being guardians 
against crime and partners with criminals.”51 
The situation did not escape the vigilance of the progressive 
reform movement.52  In fact, the police—an all too concrete symbol 
of the success of immigrant values over middle-class mores—became 
one of the central objects of the movement’s attention.53  Not only 
were detectives and officers tolerating vice and crime, they were 
lining their pockets with the proceeds.  As a result, policemen proved 
ineffectual at preventing other sorts of street crimes.  They spent 
 
 49 FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 32. 
 50 Haller, supra note 48, at 332. 
 51 Id at 331. 
 52 See WALKER, supra note 28, at 65-66; see also BERMAN, supra note 46, at 2-14; 
FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 2-12.  In New York City, the reform movement managed 
to set up an investigative committee chaired by Republican Senator Clarence Lexow 
to examine police corruption.  See BERMAN, supra note 46, at 31-32.  The report, 
together with mounting public concern, culminated in the election of the anti-
Tammany mayor William Strong.  Id.  Success, however, proved short-lived.  Id.  Like 
most cities, corruption persisted in police and municipal government well into this 
century.  Id. 
 53 The historiography of the progressive era reform movement is vast, and 
historians disagree about the precise meaning of the term.  Among the contending 
overviews are ALLEN F. DAVIS, SPEARHEADS OF REFORM: THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS AND 
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1890-1914 (1968); ROBERT WEIBE, THE SEARCH FOR 
ORDER (1967); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955).  More recent 
scholars have approached progressivism from social and cultural angles adding 
countless wrinkles, nuances, and critiques of the earlier histories.  See, e.g., GEORGE 
CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY 
MALE WORLD, 1890-1940 (1994); LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE 
POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, BOSTON, 1880-1960 (1988); ALICE KESSLER-
HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1982).  For an ambitious attempt to synthesize the material and distill some 
common elements of the era’s reform impulse, see Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of 
Progressivism, 10 REVS. IN AM. HIST. 113, 113-32 (1982).  For specific discussions of 
progressivism and corrupt urban politics, see JOHN D. BUENKER, URBAN LIBERALISM 
AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM (1973); ZANE MILLER, BOSS COX’S CINCINNATI (1968). 
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their days at the local saloon, tavern, and brothels, anywhere but their 
respective beat.54  Beginning around the turn of the century, 
reformers both inside and outside of the department sought to purge 
the police of such corruption and remove the force from the taint of 
the lower class immigrants’ questionable moral compass.55  In the 
spirit of the times, reformers pushed for greater professionalism.56  
Following the example of August Vollmer, the Chief of Police in 
Berkeley, California, reformers advocated more scientific methods of 
crime detection, standardized admission requirements, formal 
education, centralization, improved technology, and higher 
standards of policing.57 
Meanwhile, businesses took matters into their own hands, hiring 
private detectives to protect their interests.  Government officials 
joined forces only after private detectives had employed covert tactics 
to uncover the crime.58  For instance, in Wisconsin, an employer, 
suspecting that a disgruntled employee whom he recently fired posed 
a threat, hired a detective to seek out the employee and try to 
embroil him in a scheme to blow up his former place of business.59  
The private detectives informed the police only after they had 
encouraged the employee to buy dynamite and other explosives.60  
Businesses also hired private detective agencies to uncover crime and 
city corruption that threatened their chances at prized government 
contracts.  In Ohio, a manufacturer’s association hired the Burns 
Detective Agency to root out corruption in the Columbus city 
government.61  The private detectives did not call the prosecuting 
 
 54 WALKER, supra note 28, at 10, 24. 
 55 See FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 67-92.  Fogelson lists a number of reform 
initiatives.  He argues that reformers sought to impose a military structure on the 
police, to centralize their operations, and remove the force from local control.  See id. 
 56 As a part of the general faith in scientific methods during the progressive era, 
reformers uniformly sought to professionalize many different areas of American 
culture.  For histories of professionalization in the progressive era, see REGINA G. 
KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED MOTHERS AND THE 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890-1945 (1993); THOMAS HASKELL, THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 
ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (1977); DOROTHY 
ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCES (1991); BURTON BLEDSTEIN, THE 
CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1976). 
 57 WALKER, supra note 28, at 130; see also JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 70-71. 
 58 See Weiss, supra note 34, at 358-62. 
 59 Koscak v. State, 152 N.W. 181, 183 (Wis. 1915). 
 60 Id. 
 61 As an illustration of the permeable nature of private and public policing at this 
time, Harvey M. Dougherty, the head of the Secret Service during the Harding 
administration, appointed William J. Burns, the founder of the private detective 
agency involved in many of these early entrapment cases, chief of the Bureau of 
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attorney until they had installed a dictograph in a hotel room where 
the staged bribe was set to take place.62 
After 1920, police reform enjoyed some modicum of success.63  
Centralized bureaucracies began to replace decentralized precincts, 
which wrested some control from ward politicians.  Reformers 
managed to impose certain educational standards and routine 
training.64  The success of police reform tacked with the ebb and flow 
of municipal reform in general.  Formal authority, however, did not 
always correspond to actual power, and ward leaders retained a large 
degree of power well into the century even as they grew wary of 
displaying it with the abandon of earlier decades.65  Beginning in the 
early 1900s, reformers in some states did succeed in organizing state 
police forces.  In the nineteenth century, only Massachusetts and 
Texas had state police.66  By 1923, fifteen states (mostly northern 
industrial states) established similar state law enforcement bodies.67  
One historian called these new state police forces an “unprecedented 
extension of government into the lives of ordinary citizens.”68 
Perhaps even more significant than centralization, 
professionalization, privatization, and state control, was the growing 
influence of the federal government in law enforcement.  In theory, 
federal law enforcement dated back to the Federal Judiciary Act of 
1789.69  Among other things, the Act gave federal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over “offences cognizable under the authority of the 
United States.”70  Leaving the term undefined, Congress enumerated 
several specific federal offenses the following year in the Crimes Act 
 
Investigation in 1921.  See Weis, supra note 34, at 365-71.  Later, Burns worked with 
his old agency in prosecuting various high profile syndicalism cases, including the 
well-known case of Charles Ruthenberg in April 1923.  Id.  In that case, the defense 
attorney accused the government of using the Burns agency to plant documents that 
would support its case of espionage.  Id. 
 62 Diegel v. State, 1911 WL 680, at *4, *5 (Ohio Cir. Oct. 17, 1911).  The same 
agency was involved in efforts to root out city corruption in New Jersey and 
Maryland.  See State v. Dougherty, 86 N.J. 525, 531-33, 93 A. 98, 101 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
1915); Hummelshime v. State, 93 A. 990 (Md. 1915). 
 63 See JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 105-15. 
 64 Id. at 105. 
 65 See FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 110-12. 
 66 JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 156. 
 67 See id. at 155-61. 
 68 Wilbur R. Miller, Police Authority in London and New York City, 1830-1870, in 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT 335 (Robert P. Weiss ed., 1999). 
 69 1 Cong. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 70 DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829, at 5 (1985). 
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of 1790.71  Congress added crimes to the list throughout the century, 
but the number and scope of these federal crimes remained fairly 
circumscribed until the end of the century.72  The Judiciary Act also 
created the office of the United States Marshall, the first federal law 
enforcement agency.73  The United States Marshals Service grew 
increasingly responsible for bringing some modest sense of order to 
the relatively ineffectual law enforcement on the new frontier.74 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the number of federal 
crimes and the reach of federal criminal law had expanded.  Federal 
law enforcement, however, developed or evolved haphazardly within 
different branches of government, in response to the advent of 
different crimes.  For example, when Congress made mail fraud a 
crime, the post office developed agents who were eventually 
organized as the Division of Postal Inspectors in 1875.75  Similarly, the 
Treasury Department developed special agents assigned to both the 
Customs Service and the Bureau of Internal Revenue to investigate 
fraud and counterfeiting.76  As crime grew more national in scope, 
each of these new enforcement teams developed ties with the other, 
and, more importantly, with municipal and state police 
departments.77  For instance, in response to the Comstock Law of 
1873,78 which outlawed sending obscene materials through the mail, 
federal postal inspectors developed intricate networks with local 
police and exchanged information they received on state crimes for 
help with federal prosecutions.79 
That same year, the government created the Secret Service to 
protect the newly standardized currency.80  At first, the agency 
consisted of a few private detectives, who quickly developed a fairly 
sophisticated system of informers and stool pigeons to pursue the 
increasingly rampant and extensive counterfeit rings.81  By the late 
nineteenth century, however, the Secret Service became a kind of all-
purpose federal police department, lending its expertise to almost 
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any federal agency that needed it.82  However, in 1908, responding to 
some threatening investigations into the suspect behavior of several 
individual congressmen, Congress restricted the use of the Secret 
Service to policing counterfeit currency and protecting the 
president.83  In a blatant act of defiance, Attorney General Charles 
Bonaparte responded to this display of self-interest by single-
handedly creating the Bureau of Investigation within the Department 
of Justice.84  Theodore Roosevelt ordered the Secret Service to 
transfer eight agents to the new Bureau, soon to be renamed the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.85 
As legal historian Lawrence Friedman noted, “if the central 
government swells and bloats, that must have consequences”86—and it 
did just that.  In the first few decades of the twentieth century, 
Congress stretched its new regulatory wings.  In 1913, Congress 
enacted the first real income tax, which drew a whole new set of 
crimes and prosecutions in its wake.87  In addition, it set in motion a 
wide variety of regulatory statutes, including the Mann Act,88 which 
prohibited the transport of women across state lines for immoral 
purposes, thereby increasing demand for federal law enforcement.89  
World War I spawned yet more federal legislation, which in turn, 
escalated the need for more organized and powerful federal police.  
The Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and the Postal 
Inspectors grew in numbers and force after Congress passed the 
Espionage Act of 191790 and the Sedition Act of 1918.91  Following the 
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War, the infamous “Red Scare” solidified the power and intensified 
the techniques of federal law enforcement.92  In a gesture whose 
historical import probably exceeded even its author’s imagination, 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer named J. Edgar Hoover head of 
the General Intelligence Division of the Department of Justice.93 
Perhaps the single most important catalyst in creating a federal 
law enforcement presence and linking municipal police to a broad 
national agenda was the advent of national prohibition.94  The 
Eighteenth Amendment, which went into effect in 1920, and its 
statutory counterpart the Volstead Act,95 passed the year before, gave 
federal agents license to intervene in unprecedented ways.96  National 
prohibition promoted and deepened the relations between local, 
state, and national law enforcement as federal officials worked in 
conjunction, and shared information, with local police.97  Thus, 
prohibition institutionalized the federal wing of law enforcement 
while simultaneously increasing the scope and creativity of its 
undercover tactics.98 
During prohibition, the blurring of this side and that side of the 
law, prevalent in progressive-era urban machine politics, took on 
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federal dimensions.99  The examples could, and have, produced a 
great number of contemporary and historical accounts.  For the 
purposes of this article national prohibition gave new inspiration to a 
process that was already well underway.  It drew local and national 
police closer together while issuing broad licenses to enforcement 
officials to pursue increasingly intricate undercover investigations.  
For example, in an attempt to catch potential criminals in the act, the 
Prohibition Bureau imported its own liquor from Canada to retail to 
bootleggers.100  In an even an more flagrant use of illicit means to halt 
the mass consumption of alcohol federal officials operated their own 
speakeasy, called the Bridge Whist Club, in New York City and openly 
sold liquor to any willing patron.101  Izzy Einstein and Moe Smith, two 
of the more notorious prohibition agents, drew national media 
attention when they topped the records in prohibition arrests by 
disguising themselves as gravediggers, fishermen, vegetable vendors, 
and musicians to infiltrate the underworld.102 
II.  HISTORY OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 
Entrapment caught the attention of judges and academics in the 
context of this rapidly transforming system of law enforcement.  It 
gradually took hold amidst the increasingly interrelated and invasive 
tactics of both federal and local police.  While it is impossible to 
locate an exact date—a moment in time when the nature of policing 
shifted in some critical way—entrapment emerged as law 
enforcement itself had grown so remote from the original ideal 
discussed by Tocqueville in mid-century as to be virtually 
unrecognizable.  Historian Kenneth Murchison argues that 
entrapment was a judicial response to national prohibition.103  
Prohibition was clearly a key factor in the consolidation of this new 
defense, and it may, indeed, have been critical in causing the 
Supreme Court to recognize a universal federal entrapment defense.  
By looking at the state and federal cases both before and after 
national prohibition in the context of the history of law enforcement 
in general, it becomes clear that entrapment was not only a reaction 
to prohibition, but also a cumulative response to the changed nature 
of government.  Entrapment profoundly altered the relationship 
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between officials on all levels of government and the average citizen.  
This section of the article posits that entrapment has gone through 
three different stages: first, the nineteenth-century private law model 
of entrapment; second, the emergence of the defense as a means of 
exonerating criminals who were “created” by the state; and finally, 
the academic push for an objective model of entrapment designed to 
deter government misconduct.104 
No state or federal court recognized entrapment as a valid 
defense prior to 1870.  State courts did develop and apply a common 
law consent doctrine based on private law notions of contract that 
provided a prototype for the later developed entrapment doctrine.  
The doctrine of consent dictates that if force (or lack of consent) is 
an element of a crime and the victim cooperates with authorities in 
capturing the perpetrator, then courts cannot convict because the 
very act of entrapping the criminal negates a material aspect of the 
crime.105  In Eggington’s Case,106 an English decision from 1801, a band 
of robbers planned to rob a manufactory near Birmingham.  They 
contacted Phillips, a servant and watchman of the business, to gain 
valuable assistance in their plan.  Phillips apparently agreed to help 
but promptly reported the illicit plot to the proprietor, Mr. Boulton.  
Boulton instructed Phillips to continue with the plan, contacted 
authorities, and stood in wait as the unsuspecting robbers entered his 
place of business.  The court noted that when a property owner 
cooperates with authorities in capturing a burglar, he essentially 
assents to the entry, thereby negating trespass, an essential element of 
the crime.  All justices agreed, however, that knowledge of an 
impending crime did not constitute consent to its commission.  
Because Boulton did nothing to encourage the crime, he did not 
assent to the entry, and the robbers were guilty as charged.107 
American courts used this consent doctrine in some form or 
another throughout the early part of the century.108  Prior to the Civil 
War, courts in the South used Eggington’s Case and similar precedents 
to enforce various laws related to slavery.  In 1832, for instance, a 
South Carolina court upheld the conviction of a prisoner charged 
with stealing a slave.109  The defendant approached someone else’s 
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slave and attempted to persuade the slave to run away with him.110  
The slave reported the story to his master who contacted authorities 
and instructed the slave to act as if he were going to comply.111  The 
slave owner and the local police stood in wait and ultimately captured 
the thief in the act.112  The court held, much like the earlier English 
case, that the complicity of the slave owner does not negate the 
element of “taking by force” because an attempt to detect a crime 
already in progress does not constitute assent.113  There was no 
meeting of the minds because the thief did not know that the owner 
had agreed.114  Thus, the court held the victim did not agree to have 
his property taken and the defendant was guilty as charged.115 
After the Civil War, courts continued to draw on this line of 
precedent, especially in cases involving burglary.  As with the earlier 
cases, courts tended to find a way around the formal consent doctrine 
by manipulating the idea of assent or “the meeting of the minds,” 
which is common in contract law.  Thus, some courts, following the 
formal law of contract and agency, concluded that if a decoy was 
employed by the police to participate in the burglary with the consent 
of the owner, there was no burglary.116  Some courts dismissed the 
consent defense by insisting that an owner, who knows about a crime 
in advance and informs authorities, has not given his assent to the 
crime—an act which would negate an element of the trespass.117  
Either way, until the very end of the century, most state courts would 
not excuse the defendant merely because the detective initiated, 
induced, or precipitated the events if the prosecution could prove 
that all the formal elements of the crime were present.118 
The holding in Board of Commissioners of Excise v. Backus119 further 
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illustrates how courts used private law doctrines to decide the earlier 
cases involving decoys and informers.  In that case, the Board of 
Commissioners of Excise in Onandaga County employed an informer 
to buy liquor from Backus, who was ultimately convicted of violating a 
state prohibition statute.120  The Commissioners then sued to recover 
the penalty.121  The defense argued that the plaintiffs could not 
recover because their cause of action was based on an immoral or 
illegal act.122  To support this proposition, the defense invoked a 
common contract principle: courts will not lend their aid in 
enforcing an agreement which has, as its ultimate object, the 
violation of the law or public policy, or the perpetration of a fraud 
upon a third party.123  The court reasoned that because Backus was 
guiltier than the Commissioners, the two were not in pari delicto,124 
and the court ought not shield the more guilty party from the 
consequences of his act.125  In an extended coda, the court praised 
the law enforcement techniques used not only to uncover violations 
of excise laws but also to root out mail fraud and counterfeit rings.126 
At mid-nineteenth century, courts primarily expressed their 
approval of law enforcement tactics involving deceit and trickery to 
catch criminals.  In 1857, for instance, Illinois authorities hired a 
witness to buy liquor from an individual suspected of violating state 
prohibition laws.127  In dismissing an attempt at the entrapment 
defense, the court admonished: 
If men who voluntarily or otherwise become acquainted with the 
secret brothels, gambling and drinking hells with which our cities 
and villages are sometimes overrun, and our neighbors and our 
children are corrupted and ruined, are to lose their character for 
veracity, and are to be denounced as informers and spies, for 
seeking out and bringing these evil practices to light, then are our 
hopes of protection slight indeed.128 
By the late 1870s and 80s, this high praise for covert operations, 
was glaringly absent from court decisions.  While clinging to the 
language of contract law in disposing of the cases, many courts went 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 “Pari delicto” literally translated means “in equal fault.”  GILBERT’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 233 (pocket verstion 1997). 
 125 Id. 
 126 29 How. Pr. 33. 
 127 President of the Town of St. Charles v. Peter O’Mailey, 18 Ill. 407 (Ill. 1857). 
 128 Id. at 414; see also Bd. of Comm’rs of Excise v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1864). 
 274 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:257 
beyond the rubric and denounced the involvement of the state in 
their overzealous pursuit of undercover investigations and 
prosecutions.129  In Michigan, a lawyer was convicted of taking public 
records from a courtroom.130  He had asked his friend, a police guard, 
to leave the door of the courtroom open.131  The guard agreed, but 
quickly informed authorities.132  The stool pigeon and the police 
stood by and arrested him as he shuffled through the papers.133  In 
reversing the conviction on the ground that the state consented to 
the entry, the court chastised: 
[t]he course pursued by the officers in this case was utterly 
indefensible.  Where a person contemplating the commission of 
an offense approaches an officer of the law, and asks his 
assistance, it would seem to be the duty of the latter, according to 
the plainest principles of duty and justice, to decline to render 
such assistance, and to take such steps as would be likely to 
prevent the commission of the offense[.]134 
Another court insisted that “it is one of the most disgraceful instances 
of criminal contrivance to induce a man to commit a crime in order 
to get him convicted that has ever been before us.”135  The judge 
continued by positing that “it is a diabolical business, which if not 
punishable probably ought to be.”136  An Illinois court echoed this 
new sentiment: “[s]uch means and agents are more dangerous to the 
welfare of society than are the crimes they were intended to detect 
and the criminals they were to arrest.”137 
The state cases involving informers and decoys between the close 
of the Civil War and the turn of the century dealt with a large 
number of scenarios.  They included, for example, prosecutions for 
burglary,138 violations of state excise laws,139 keeping houses of ill 
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fame,140 and bribing public officials.141  By the 1920s, the vast majority 
of state court defendants, who tried to escape conviction with the 
entrapment defense, were indicted under state and federal 
prohibition laws.  While recognizing the theoretical validity of the 
defense, most courts refused to apply it.142  Other courts simply held 
that entrapment could never excuse defendants of violating liquor 
laws because the law itself did not require malicious intent.143  A 
minority of courts, however, either reversed or modified the sentence 
after severely criticizing the government’s tactics.144 
While courts encountered the defense with a good deal more 
frequency after 1920, the percentage of cases excusing a defendant 
on the ground that he was entrapped remained fairly constant 
throughout the early part of the century.145  What is significant, 
however, is the changed nature of the defense.  Whether state courts 
reversed the conviction or not, by the turn of the century, state courts 
understood entrapment not in formal, contractual, and private law 
terms, but rather as a way of ascertaining voluntariness in the context 
of a prevalent and powerful state using increasingly sophisticated law 
enforcement techniques.  In coping with covert law enforcement 
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operations, courts stretched contract law to its extreme.  The consent 
doctrine proved inadequate because, in theory, any defendant could 
argue that if the government used decoys, informers, or traps of any 
sort it consented to the crime.  One court tried to circumvent this 
problem.146  Confronted with a case in which a lawyer bribed public 
officials to give him the indictments of a business partner and friend, 
the court analyzed intricate legal contortions to distinguish the 
earlier consent cases.147  The court insisted that even though the 
officials willingly handed over the indictments to catch the defendant 
in the act, there was no consent because there is a difference between 
public and private ownership of property.148  If a private party delivers 
property to someone voluntarily, then there can be no trespass.  If, 
however, the property belonged to the state and the state cannot 
consent through individual officers, the element of trespass remained 
unmarred by the district attorney’s voluntary participation.149  Not 
surprisingly, entrapment soon outgrew its increasingly ill-suited roots 
in private law concepts.150 
Early traces of this shift can be found in the last few decades of 
the nineteenth century.  Courts edged toward a new understanding 
of the law that ultimately evolved into the entrapment defense.  
Reacting with increasing outrage at police tactics, the courts began to 
recognize, albeit in superfluous language not directly related to the 
holding of the case, that contract principles could not comprehend 
the concept they wished to convey.  Thus, a Michigan court 
concluded that it is the role of the state “to tend to the elevation and 
improvement of the would-be criminal, rather than to his further 
debasement.”151  In another case, the same court noted that the fact 
that a defendant had a bad, immoral character could not justify 
luring him into a specific crime.152 
 
 146 People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1904). 
 147 See id. at 789-91. 
 148 See id. at 791, 788-89. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Even in that case, Judge O’Brien offered a dissent that focused primarily on 
the voluntariness of the defendant’s actions rather than ideas of contract and 
property, which are more properly suited to private complaints.  Thus, he reasoned 
that the conviction should be vacated because there is a difference between a 
contemplated crime and unlawful intentions and the state unjustly “stimulat[ed] 
unlawful intentions.”  Id. (O’Brien, J., dissenting). 
 151 Saunders, 38 Mich. at 222. 
 152 People v. McCord, 42 N.W. 1106, 1109 (Mich. 1889).  This language may well 
have been a part of the new progressive reform discourse.  Historians have noted, in 
general, a shift from a punitive to a rehabilitative model in charitable movements, 
jurisprudence, and reform rhetoric in general.  See, e.g., KUNZEL, supra note 56, at 1-9; 
LORI D. GINZBERG, WOMEN AND THE WORK OF BENEVOLENCE: MORALITY, POLITICS, AND 
 2003 THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 277 
In the late 1890s in Momence, Illinois, a city councilman hired a 
private detective firm to prevent a string of robberies that seemed to 
be plaguing the area.153  The detective came to town and befriended 
some local boys by lavishing them with money and treating them to 
expensive cigars and liquor.154  After weeks of feigned friendship, the 
detective convinced the defendants to join him in robbing an 
office.155  The appeals court reversed the burglary conviction and 
firmly noted that this foreign detective’s “efforts were not directed to 
the arrest of criminals, but his mental powers and robust health, with 
the use of money, were directed towards an effort to make criminals 
of these young men.”156  The court commented, “with plenty to drink 
and smoke and eat at his expense, he sought to undermine and 
dazzle their mental and moral strength and lead them into the 
commission of crime.”157  The principles of contract and the consent 
doctrine played a minor role in the case.  Rather, the malleability of 
human nature, the power of the state, and the state’s endless 
resources to transform that nature and change the normal course of 
events by creating criminals impressed the court.158  The court noted 
“[s]trong men are sometimes unprepared to cope with temptation 
and resist encouragement to evil when financially embarrassed and 
impoverished.”159  A far cry from the moralistic musings of the New 
York court and its invocation of the unforgiving God of the old 
testament, this court began to develop traces of an entrapment 
doctrine which could encompass and define a new sort of 
individuality—one in which will and identity are no longer set in 
stone and the government itself can undermine an individual’s 
resolve with its vast resources and awesome power.160 
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By the 1920s, the old incarnation of entrapment, applicable only 
when the victim’s consent vitiates a material element of the crime, 
virtually disappeared.  In its place, state courts developed the modern 
version of the entrapment defense.  This modern version focuses on 
whether criminal intent originated with the defendant. A successful 
defense proved that the government manipulated the defendant into 
committing a crime he would not otherwise have consummated.161  
Thus, the courts evaluated the actions of government officials and 
their informers only insofar as they were relevant in determining the 
origin of criminal design.162  Toward the end of the 1920s, one court 
approved of the following instruction on entrapment: where the 
defendant “had no criminal intent to violate the . . . [law], but is 
induced to become a law violator by reason of the arts and wiles of 
public officials to depart from the path of being a law-abiding citizen 
into the commission of crime.”163  Another court clarified, “it is not 
proper, even during an investigation, to entice or persuade any one 
contrary to his own will or inclination, to violate the laws of this state; 
and if you find that the criminal design originated not with the 
accused, but was conceived in the mind of the officers of the state, 
and the accused was by persuasion or inducement lured into the 
commission of a criminal act,” then it is proper to acquit.164  By the 
end of the prohibition decade, this language was quite common, and 
the question of entrapment had shifted almost entirely from a formal 
analysis of the elements of the crime and the evaluation of consent 
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with old contract principles to a new focus on the malleability of 
human nature in light of the powerful state. 
Even in burglary cases, where nineteenth-century courts had 
traditionally and uniformly employed the consent doctrine, 
twentieth-century judges phrased their opinions in terms of whether 
the government, together with its agents, informers, and stool 
pigeons “induce[d] the original intent.”165  In one case decided in 
1915, Dr. Sanders, an Alabama state health officer, employed Avery, 
an applicant to practice medicine in the state, to help capture a 
suspect.166  Avery approached the defendant and offered him $100 to 
raid Dr. Sanders’s office and steal the medical examination results.167  
The appeals court reversed the conviction, but not on the ground 
that Dr. Sanders consented to the burglary, but because the criminal 
intent originated with Dr. Sanders, an agent of the government, not 
with the defendant.168  Therefore, the government could not 
prosecute because it had implanted the intent in the defendant’s 
mind.169 
Not surprisingly, federal courts dealt with different sorts of 
crimes and thus, the entrapment defense arose in different contexts.  
The trajectory and development of the federal defense followed the 
state courts but lagged behind by about two decades.  Regulating 
everyday life was largely the business of the states prior to the 
twentieth century;170 during this period the federal system rarely 
encountered the kinds of law enforcement tactics that drew the 
criticism and ire of state court judges.  It makes sense, therefore, that 
entrapment simply would not come up in federal courts. 
By the turn of the century, the entire body of federal criminal 
law was changing and expanding quite significantly.171  Most notably, 
Congress enacted a number of statutes that insinuated the federal 
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government into what Lawrence Friedman calls the “life-area.”172  In 
other words, Congress began using the commerce clause to regulate 
sex, morals, and daily conduct—areas that had previously occupied a 
predominantly local concern.  Not only did the federal government 
venture into new territory, it also contributed to the growing number 
of victimless crimes, crimes against the public, or more particularly, 
crimes against public morality.173  All of these new crimes were 
difficult to detect without developing elaborate systems of 
information and links with the underworld.174 
Significantly, in 1876, Congress passed a statute175 which imposed 
criminal sanctions on anyone who sent obscene matter through the 
mail.176  Shortly thereafter, an agent of an anti-vice squad in St. Louis, 
known as “The Society of the Suppression of Vice,” approached 
postal inspectors with his suspicion that a particular doctor was 
violating the law.177  The postal employees eagerly approved of the 
agent’s plan and the agent proceeded to compose a letter to his 
suspect requesting information about contraception.178  He signed his 
request with a made-up name, Miss Nettie G. Harlan of Butler, 
Georgia, and put it in the mail.  When the doctor responded with 
only thinly veiled illicit information, the postal employees pulled his 
letter from the mail and gave it to the agent.179  Relying, in part, on 
the consent doctrine drawn from the state burglary cases, the court, 
in United States v. Whittier,180 reasoned that even though the defendant 
is “as morally guilty as if the letter he was answering had been written 
by a person seeking the prohibited information, and not by a 
detective,” the situation lies outside the particular language of the 
statute.181  In other words, because the defendant’s letter was written 
and addressed to a fictitious person, there is no way that it could have 
given “the prohibited information” to anyone, as required by law.182  
Patterned once again on private law, on crime with a perpetrator and 
a victim, the court developed the first federal precursor to 
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entrapment law.  Applying an extremely formal interpretation of the 
statute, a method in vogue at that time, the court dismissed the 
indictment.183 
This doctrine concerning decoys and mail fraud persisted for 
decades.  Like the analogous state court doctrine of consent, 
however, it evolved and changed.  In the 1880s and 90s, courts 
stretched the private law concepts to their extreme.184  A federal court 
in Illinois argued that contributory negligence on the part of the 
government could not constitute a defense unless the government 
somehow broke the causal relationship between the offender and the 
offense.185  Courts simply did not have the language to explain the 
concept.  They grasped at familiar doctrine for help, but the causal 
relationship between offender and offense proved an odd and 
awkward way of explaining voluntariness.186  Feeling the limits of 
private law concepts, courts picked up on the tone of the concurring 
opinion in Whittier.  Writing separately, Judge Treat focused less on 
the letter of the law or the fictitious nature of the “victim,” and 
insisted that what was really appalling was the government’s effort to 
“induce or manufacture crime.”187  Faced with the same or similar 
statutes, courts further developed that rationale, arguing that the 
defendants were not guilty and convictions could not stand where 
government officials procured the crime.188  Following Whittier, one 
court rejected an entrapment defense to the aforementioned statute, 
arguing that law enforcement traps warrant reversal “when the 
defendant was the passive tool of the entrapping party.” 189  The issue 
of decoys used to catch violations of various rules involving the mail 
reached the United States Supreme Court on several different 
occasions in the mid-1890s.  In United States v. Grimm,190 the first such 
case, Justice Brewer wasted little time in concluding that there is no 
defense where the postal inspector did not intend “to induce or 
solicit the commission of a crime.”  The Court relied on Grimm to 
dismiss two other pleas for relief under the aforementioned statute.191 
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The first entrapment case, outside of the mail fraud decoy 
context, reached the federal courts in 1915.192  Seven years earlier, 
California immigration agents suspected that Woo Wai, a Chinese-
American merchant, had information about a smuggling ring, which 
was so pervasive that it involved various high-level government 
officials.193  Hoping to arrest Woo Wai for violating the immigration 
laws and get him “in the door” so he would provide information on 
the other suspects, the government agents sought to involve him in 
an elaborate plan to smuggle illegal Chinese aliens from Mexico.194  
Woo Wai refused to participate on several occasions.195  Undaunted, 
officials used government funds to hire a detective who brought Woo 
Wai from San Francisco to San Diego on two separate occasions in 
order to entice him to join the operation.196  After two trips down the 
coast and extensive coaxing, Woo Wai finally acquiesced.197  Poised as 
Woo Wai crossed the border with the illegal aliens in tow, 
immigration agents arrested him and offered him immunity if he 
cooperated in uncovering the smuggling operation.198  He refused, 
opting instead to go to trial on the charge that he conspired to bring 
illegal aliens across the border in violation of the immigration laws.199 
At trial, Woo Wai argued that the government agents had 
unfairly lured him into the crime.200  The district court promptly 
issued an instruction denying the existence of any such defense.  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on two separate 
grounds.201  First, it drew on the state court consent doctrine to 
reason that because the government consented to the admission of 
the aliens, there was no offense.202  Second, the court offered its 
innovative spin: “sound public policy can be upheld only by denying 
the criminality of those who are thus induced to commit acts which 
infringe the letter of the criminal statutes.”203  Distinguishing relevant 
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state law cases and echoing others, the court held that when the 
criminal intent does not originate in the mind of the defendant, he 
cannot be held responsible.204  Thus, the precedent was set.  The 
court offered two rationales: the first, reminiscent of the older state 
cases, reasoned by analogy to private law doctrine; and, the second, 
insisted that an act simply was not “criminal” if the government itself 
manufactured the crime and manipulated the defendant into 
committing it.205 
As the cases progressed into the twentieth century, the language 
of consent became more rare, muted by the more pervasive rationale 
that an individual defendant cannot act of his own free will if he was 
sufficiently manipulated by the government.  A few years later, 
another case arose out of similar facts.206  The court concluded 
without much difficulty, “[w]here the officers of the law have incited 
the party to commit the crime charged and lured him on to its 
consummation, the law will not authorize a verdict of guilty.”207  Like 
the later state cases, the federal courts that acknowledged the 
entrapment defense in the 1910s focused on the origin of the 
criminal intent.208 
Courts disagreed on where to draw the line, and as Kenneth 
Murchison artfully argues, the outcome of their reasoning often 
reflected their own, and the public’s, attitude to the law under which 
the defendant was indicted.209  The early state and federal entrapment 
cases, however, did not only involve violations of prohibition laws.  
Like Woo Wai and the state bribery cases, many were the result of the 
efforts of an overzealous reform movement, which had gradually 
made its way into various wings of law enforcement.  What is striking 
about the cases that recognize the defense is not the particular 
statutes under which they arose, but rather the organized and 
sophisticated nature of the law enforcement offensive considered by 
the courts.  Both federal and state courts had to reinvent the doctrine 
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to suit this new situation.  They discarded the terms of contract and 
other private law models and adopted a new theory of entrapment 
based on a new idea of what constitutes voluntary action in the 
presence of a large, centralized, and bureaucratic state. 
The subtle shift in language may not have had a huge impact on 
who served time for which crime, but significantly, both defense 
lawyers and judges now framed their understanding of criminal 
responsibility in a new way.  The idea that the government could 
“create” a criminal was a new concept.  The twentieth-century legal 
doctrine of entrapment, which embodied the idea that the state 
wielded some kind of power to manipulate the very essence of its 
citizens, was an innovation in the law.  The later state and federal 
entrapment cases made the implication of this new focus on criminal 
intent explicit, excusing a criminal defendant only when the state 
authorities created him.  Thus, one state court admonished, “decoys 
and artifices may be employed to entrap criminals, but not to create 
them.”210  Another rejected the defendant’s claim that the state 
officials were engaged in a “conspiracy to create a criminal.”211  In a 
West Virginia court, the judge grasped at various metaphors to 
explain the law, stating, there can be no entrapment unless “the 
defendant was plastic clay in the hands of the entrappers. . . .  It is not 
the decoy of a criminal which public policy condemns but the 
implanting of the germ of criminality, no matter how favorable the 
culture.”212 
Federal courts used the same language to express alarm at the 
government’s ability to distort the will of its citizens.  In an attempt to 
catch a suspect violating an act that prohibed the sale of liquor to 
Indians, federal officials hired a witness who did not appear to be an 
Indian.213  The court declared, “[d]ecoys are permissible to entrap 
criminals, but not to create them, to present opportunity to those 
having intent to or willing to commit crime but not to ensnare the 
law-abiding in unconscious offending.”214  The court reasoned that 
the combination between ignorance of fact and government 
solicitation “stamps the act as involuntary” because the defendant had 
become a merely passive instrument of governmental design.215  The 
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Ninth Circuit echoed this idea of free will noting that, “[t]he 
government is not engaged in the business of manufacturing 
criminals.”216  The federal cases that followed in the 1920s similarly 
focused the inquiry on the power of the state, through sheer force of 
persuasion, to change the course of human conduct and eradicate 
individual free will.217 
While the shift was subtle, it is nonetheless evident.  The earlier 
cases defined will, freedom, and voluntariness by reference to actions.  
If a defendant committed an illegal act without physical coercion in 
the nineteenth-century cases, he did so of his free will.  The consent 
doctrine, for instance focused on the victim’s acquiescence in the 
crime, not on the defendant’s free will, because the voluntariness of 
the defendant’s actions was presupposed.  This mirrors the biblical 
interaction of Eve and the serpent.  The reason God did not excuse 
Eve is that she acted against his edict, and was therefore culpable.  
The serpent wielded a good deal more power than Eve and his tactics 
were certainly unfair, but in the mind of the Old Testament Deity 
and the New York court which invoked Him, that was not really 
relevant.  By the twentieth century, courts had taken a noticeable 
turn.  In response to a new kind of state with an intricate network of 
national, local, and private law enforcement tools at its fingertips, 
courts generated and adopted the following new concepts: (1) that 
an individual’s will can be undermined; (2) that an individual’s 
personality can evolve and change; and (3) that an individual free 
from coercion is not necessarily free.  Under this rubric, an individual 
is not responsible for his acts if the state manipulated his will.. 
The older idea of character based on a Judeo-Christian 
conception of the fixed and unchanging self, with virtues and vices 
that can be more or less controlled by the individual, dominated 
earlier case law.218  One appellate court made it clear that this version 
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no longer suited the modern world.219  The trial court invoked Jesus 
in its jury charge stating,  “on the night before the crucifixion, Jesus 
tempted Judas Iscariot: that he could have remained away and saved 
Judas Iscariot from committing the despicable crime . . . of betraying 
his master.”  It may be argued, the court continued, that Jesus 
tempted Judas, but that provided no excuse because “it was in the 
heart of this man.”220  On appeal, the court concluded that it was an 
error to rule out the entrapment defense altogether and noted that 
the instruction was unduly prejudicial.221  The emergence of the 
defense based on the vulnerability of individuals and the elusiveness 
of free will embodied a definition of freedom and individuality that 
directly contradicted older biblical notions. 
As the doctrine developed across the continent, federal courts 
gradually proved more liberal in ordering lower courts to consider all 
the evidence related to the entrapment defense.222  Kenneth 
Murchison argues that it was prohibition that prompted courts to 
open their doors to the new defense.223  While the widely 
controversial prohibition laws might have served as a catalyst, the 
array of cases in the early part of the twenty-first century set the stage.  
The language of the defense was already well established in both the 
federal and state courts by the time the prohibition cases flooded the 
courts.  Prohibition may have brought entrapment to the attention of 
the federal judiciary in a way that it found hard to ignore but the 
defense had already developed over the course of many decades as a 
collective response to a radically changed universe of law 
enforcement. 
Meanwhile, legal commentators were largely unmoved by the 
judicial development of the entrapment defense.  Nineteenth-century 
treatises rarely mentioned the subject and if they did, they did so by 
explaining the doctrine of consent.224  In his treatise on criminal law 
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published in 1895, for instance, William Clark coupled the fact that 
consent to sexual intercourse negates an element of rape with the 
notion that a cooperating witness’s consent negates an element of 
larceny or robbery.225  In the early decades of the twentieth century, 
the defense drew few comments from students cataloguing cases and 
even fewer scholarly studies.226  In the second half of the prohibition 
decade, however, academics took a greater interest in entrapment 
and, like the courts, they seemed to embrace the defense as if it had 
always been around.227  These later comments, like the court cases 
they discussed, generally noted that entrapment serves as a successful 
defense where the criminal intent originates with the government 
agents rather than the accused.228  As one commentator put it in the 
late 1920s, courts apply the defense when “acts of the officers 
instigating and procuring the crime have gone so far as to wash the 
necessary guilty intent from the mind of the accused and render him 
a mere tool with no intent.”229  Another commentator remarked that 
the origin of the criminal design is only the beginning of the inquiry; 
entrapment can only succeed as a defense if the government 
deprived the accused of “volition and willing compliance.”230  Others 
put it slightly differently, arguing that if government officials produce 
a crime that the defendant would not otherwise have committed, the 
defendant can claim that he was unjustly entrapped.231  Treatises in 
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the second half of the century echoed this sentiment.232 
While prohibition did not create the entrapment defense, the 
growing skepticism about liquor laws prompted both courts and 
commentators to adopt a new rationale for the defense.  At the end 
of the decade, scholars argued that the entrapment defense was 
worthwhile because it served to deter the overly aggressive and 
invasive behavior of law enforcement officials.  They argued that 
whether or not the government agents had reasonable suspicion and 
acted in good faith prior to setting their trap provides a doctrinal 
check on executive power.233  This reasoning is notably absent from 
the earlier judicial decisions implementing the defense, but it did 
make a subtle appearance in a few cases in the mid-twenties.234  In 
these cases, courts never explicitly invoked deterrence as the purpose 
of entrapment, rather, courts suggested that if the government agents 
implemented a trap without reasonable suspicion, they acted contrary 
to public policy, which counsels against inducing individuals to 
commit crimes, and dictates that courts should not countenance such 
conduct.235 
While the lower courts and academics struggled to define the 
contours of the entrapment defense, the Supreme Court remained 
silent.236  It was not until 1928 that the Court acknowledged this new 
defense in federal criminal law.  The case which first made its way to 
the United States Supreme Court was a narcotics case: Federal agents 
suspected that Casey, an attorney, was soaking towels with illegal 
opiates and delivering them to federal prisoners at a county jail.237  
Federal narcotics agents recruited George Cicero, a convicted felon 
and drug addict, and Mrs. Nelson, another prisoner’s sister-in-law, to 
serve as their stool pigeons.238  The agents installed a dictaphone in 
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the attorney-client cage and deposited money in Cicero’s prison 
credit account.239  They listened from an adjacent room while both 
Cicero and Nelson solicited drugs from Casey.240  Without much 
comment, Justice Holmes rejected Casey’s plea that he had been 
trapped into committing the crime.241  Justice Brandeis dissented.242  
He remarked that he could not consider the substantive offense 
because “officers of the government instigated the commission of the 
alleged crime.”243  Justice Brandeis clarified that his objection does 
not rest merely upon the character of the evidence or upon the fact 
that the evidence was illegally obtained.244  The obstacle to the 
prosecution lies in the fact that the alleged crime was instigated by 
officers of the government; that the act for which the government 
seeks to punish the defendant is the fruit of their criminal conspiracy 
to induce its commission.245 
Further, the Justice insisted that the government could set 
decoys and lay traps, “[b]ut it may not provoke or create a crime and 
then punish the criminal, its creature.”246  Categorizing Casey as a 
“detective-made criminal,” Brandeis offered two reasons for his 
dissent, arguing that the court could not sanction the government’s 
unauthorized and unjustifiable conduct and that Casey’s action could 
not be considered an act of his own free will.247 
Four years later, the majority of the Court adopted Brandeis’s 
reasoning.  In United States v. Sorrells, the defendant was convicted of 
violating the National Prohibition Act.248  At trial, he relied on an 
entrapment defense, claiming that government agents staged a crime 
and lured him into committing it.249  In an elaborate effort to catch 
Sorrels in an illicit act, a government agent posed as a tourist and 
recruited Sorrells’s friends to introduce him.250  After using various 
intelligence sources, he found out that Sorrells had fought in World 
War I.251  The agent then pretended to be a veteran of the same 
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Division.  After winning his confidence in this cunning way, the agent 
asked for liquor on three separate occasions.252  Sorrells finally gave 
in.253  The Court noted that: 
the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for 
which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition 
agent, that it was the creature of his purpose, that defendant had 
no previous disposition to commit it . . . and that the agent lured 
defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and 
persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage 
of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as 
companions in arms in the World War.254 
Chief Justice Hughes paused, “[s]uch a gross abuse of authority given 
for the purpose of detecting and punishing crime, and not for the 
making of criminals, deserves the severest condemnation.”255  
Following the vast majority of circuits, the Court held that when the 
criminal design originates with the government, it may not prosecute 
the individual who it caught and enticed into its plan.256 
While the Supreme Court might have used substantive due 
process to build the defense permanently into the law, the Court 
chose not to do so.  Instead, the justices insisted that Congress could 
not possibly have intended its statute to cover a situation like this—
where government agents lured an innocent person into committing 
a crime.257  Thus, the defense, which just decades before occupied a 
small and precarious position in both state and federal courts, had 
evolved into such a commonsense guage of criminal responsibility 
that the Supreme Court was willing to conclude it would be absurd 
for Congress to have intended any criminal statute to include 
prosecution and punishment of those enticed and trapped by 
government agents.258  In Sorrells, the government argued that the 
defendant waived the entrapment defense by not mentioning it in his 
plea of not guilty and failing to plead it to bar further proceedings 
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under the indictment.259  The Court rejected this contention, arguing 
that it follows from the misconception that the defense is not a denial 
of guilt but rather some sort of judicial bar or equitable doctrine that 
prevents the government from proceeding when its agents have 
behaved unjustly.260  Entrapment, the Sorrells Court explained, “is 
available, not in the view that the accused though guilty may go free,” 
but rather pertains directly to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant.261  It is significant that the Court chose not to use 
substantive due process, a doctrine employed throughout the 
previous decades, to defeat reform legislation and protect freedom of 
contract.  Perhaps perceiving the already precarious position of 
substantive due process, the Court chose a different track, elevating 
this new aspect of freedom above such contractual rights. 
Justice Roberts wrote separately to emphasize a slightly different 
basis for his adoption of entrapment.  Rather than locate the source 
of the defense in Congressional intent, Justice Roberts chose to focus 
on the inherent supervisory power of the courts.  His opinion echoed 
the flurry of academic articles published at the end of the previous 
decade and a few recent federal cases.  The Justice stated that, 
“[n]either courts of equity nor those administering legal remedies 
tolerate the use of their process to consummate a wrong.  The 
doctrine of entrapment in criminal law is the analogue of the same 
rule applied in civil proceedings.”262  Justice Roberts argued that, 
while cloaked as an effort to tailor the law to a new view of criminal 
responsibility, entrapment was really a deterrent.  Judges considered 
entrapment a judicial rule analogous to the various civil law doctrines 
that prevent plaintiffs from resorting to the courts when they have 
behaved in an illegal or grossly unethical manner.263 
It may have been the waning popularity of prohibition that 
caused the Supreme Court to adopt the entrapment defense and 
articulate the new deterrent rationale, but the definition of criminal 
responsibility had already shifted.  Courts had already redefined the 
relationship between the government and the individual.  By insisting 
that no federal criminal statute could possibly imply otherwise, the 
Supreme Court crystallized the relationship and implanted itself in 
the role of patrolling this new boundary between state and citizen, 
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government official and civilian.264 
Thus, as the scope and reach of both state and federal criminal 
law grew at the end of the century, law enforcement grew with it.  
Judges and courts, largely without assistance from the academy, 
invented the doctrine of entrapment to accommodate this new 
amorphous form of government.265  By shifting away from private law 
notions of contract, courts slowly redefined criminal responsibility 
and realigned the precarious balance between government and the 
citizen.  With little fanfare, courts and legal doctrine contributed to a 
new definition of free will, one which comprehended the power of 
the state—through manipulation, trickery, and deception—to alter 
personality and change the course of human conduct in some fatal 
way.  The dominant justification for entrapment finally articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Sorrells centered on a definition of freedom 
and responsibility that had evolved over the past several decades.266  
Some of the later federal cases, many law review commentaries in the 
later part of the 1920s, and the dissent in Sorrells suggest a related but 
distinct rationale: that entrapment is necessary for the purity of the 
government and its various agencies and agents, and the defense 
somehow deters government abuses of power and should be allowed 
despite the indisputable guilt of the accused.  This sort of reasoning 
emerged only after most federal and state courts had adopted the 
defense.  It served only a recessive role—while popular with 
academics, it did not dominate the early court cases on entrapment. 
III.  ENTRAPMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 
This history of the entrapment defense, discussed in the 
preceding section, has spawned two warring tests to evaluate whether 
a defendant was impermissibly entrapped.267  The first of these tests, 
the subjective test, asks whether the defendant was predisposed to 
commit the crime before encouraged to do so by a government 
actor.268  The second test, the objective test, exonerates the defendant 
if government conduct exceeded acceptable limits.269  The subjective 
test, espoused by the majority of the Sorrells Court, dominated judicial 
decisions from the beginning of the defense’s history.270  This test 
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makes sense if we view entrapment as a way of approximating 
whether the defendant acted of his own free will, rendering him 
guilty and responsible under the law.  The objective test follows 
logically from later rationale, articulated most succinctly by Justice 
Roberts in his Sorrells concurrence, that courts should not sanction 
this sort of abuse of governmental authority.271 
The history of law enforcement and entrapment is useful 
because it illustrates that the defense emerged primarily as a way of 
redefining criminal responsibility and autonomy after the Civil War.  
Most courts in the first few decades of the defense reasoned that the 
accused simply was not guilty if government officials manufactured 
the crime and molded the criminal. Judges did not use the defense 
primarily to deter, or even to send a message condemning 
governmental misconduct until well into the twentieth century.  This 
chronology is relevant because it helps explain why courts have clung 
rather stubbornly to the subjective test in analyzing entrapment.  The 
two rationales are related in that they both call for a particular 
boundary between the individual and the state, but the objective test 
follows logically only if the primary role of the defense is to deter 
governmental misconduct and preserve the purity of the courts.272  
The subjective test embodies the slightly different earlier concern 
about what exactly constitutes criminal responsibility: A person 
cannot be considered responsible if he did not act of his own free 
will, especially when the government has the power to undermine 
free will through its control over resources and information, and 
through its power of persuasion. 
Following the lead of early academic reflections on entrapment, 
most contemporary commentators suggest that courts abandon the 
impractical, and arguably even futile, subjective test.273  While 
attempting to ascertain the criminal predisposition of the accused is a 
clumsy and imprecise tool, the history of the defense indicates that 
we should allow courts to try.  This particular inquiry enables courts 
to draw, erase, and redraw the line between government and citizen, 
a judicial role which has come to make sense to us.  Thus, the 
frustrating task of locating the origin of criminal intent serves an 
important role in providing doctrinal room to shape an evolving 
notion of the proper interaction between the state and the individual, 
and in securing the position of the courts to police the parameters of 
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that precarious relationship.274 
For example, sparked in part by the controversy over the role of 
the independent counsel in uncovering incriminating evidence about 
former President Bill Clinton275 and the debate over law enforcement 
and the Internet,276 recent literature on the entrapment defense 
almost universally condemns the subjective test.277  But, courts do not 
appear to comply with the cries of the academy.  While the 
theoretical critique of the subjective test is perfectly logical, the 
subjective formulation perseveres for precisely the same reason that 
entrapment emerged in the first place; it allows the law to articulate 
and develop its own version of what it means to act freely in the 
modern world.  By recognizing some elusive moment when the state 
has managed to manipulate its citizens and undermine free will 
through sheer force of persuasion, courts generate an evolving 
definition of freedom and individuality. 
In his seminal article, Michael Seidman argues that because 
there is no such thing as predisposition, the two tests collapse.278  He 
reasons that as long as one equates predisposition with readiness to 
commit a crime, courts can only guess at its existence by positing 
some level of inducement to which even an innocent, or non-
predisposed person, would respond.279  Thus, in order to distinguish 
the defendant who is worthy of exoneration from the one who is not, 
courts will have to analyze the propriety of government conduct—the 
very factor that the subjective test pretends to ignore.280  The problem 
with this theory, as Ronald Allen points out, is that it assumes what it 
is trying to prove—that the only way to evaluate an individual’s state 
of mind is by reference to an objective test.281  Other forms of 
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evidence such as character witnesses and the defendant’s own 
statements, though certainly difficult to evaluate, may be relevant.282 
 Even so, Seidman continues, police officers generally direct 
their efforts toward those who are predisposed to commit a crime.283  
The two tests would reach different results only in the rare instance 
where the police reasonably but incorrectly assume that a given 
suspect is predisposed.284  Allen criticizes this conclusion, arguing that 
the objective test questions the propriety of the police officers’ 
conduct not the target of their inducement.285  He clarifies that the 
two tests collapse because the factfinder has no direct access to a 
defendant’s state of mind.286  The only way to determine 
predisposition is by approximating how a reasonable person would 
behave.287  While Seidman’s argument, coupled with Allen’s 
amendment, makes sense, it too rests on the premise that because 
judges and juries cannot possibly get inside the defendant’s mind, 
they ought not try.288 
Additionally, Allen more convincing argues that predisposition is 
a fictional entity, a concept that cannot really exist.289  If you assume 
that almost everyone would commit a crime if provoked or enticed in 
some extreme way, then predisposition by itself cannot distinguish 
between those entitled to the entrapment defense and those who are 
not.290  He notes, 
[t]he real point is that talk of “predisposition” is meaningless and 
commits an existential fallacy.  A person who takes the bait has 
had his price met; a person who does not, has not.  But, the 
person who does not take the bait almost always surely would take 
a higher, even if greatly higher, bait.  The failure to take this one 
is evidence of his price, but not of predisposition.291 
Allen goes on to argue that while this “silly” idea of 
predisposition fails to distinguish between defendants, whether or 
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not they responded to “market level inducements” does.292  He insists 
that we should exonerate only those individuals who responded to 
inducements that exceed real world market rates.293  He envisions 
both a financial and emotional market.294  Punishing someone who 
responds to extra-market inducement could not possibly further the 
goals of criminal law—to deter, to incapacitate, and to rehabilitate—
while prosecuting a defendant for responding to market level 
inducements would.295  Responding to an anticipated adversary, Allen 
argues that it may be difficult to ascertain the market price of 
inducements but it could not possibly be as futile as the subjective 
test, which requires “literally proof of the nonexistent.”296 
Allen scoffs at the courts’ efforts to curb the government’s power 
to “create criminals.”297  A modern-day Jerome Frank, Allen seems to 
want to purge the law of all its subjective musings.  Attempting to 
determine a precise market level for the kind of emotional 
manipulation involved in sting operations, however, strikes this writer 
as equally absurd.  He proposes that we estimate this market value by 
calling in experts.298  He suggests that rather than use the fuzzy 
evidence to show the defendant’s subjective state of mind, courts can 
use experts to determine the market price for emotional 
manipulation to commit a crime.299  Relying on expert evidence and 
social science in this way ignores the fact that in its unscientific way, 
the common law generates its own evolving definition of the self, of 
individuality, and responsibility.  While at times, resorting to the 
social sciences may be appropriate, it cannot always provide the 
answer to shaky, indeterminate, and subjective doctrinal judgments.  
Any effort to determine a given defendant’s predisposition, like many 
other concepts in the law, will involve the factfinder’s generalizing 
from her own experience and from what she believes is the normal, 
average way to act.  That this is the case does not necessarily mean 
courts should abandon efforts to approximate subjective intent.  
Language is imprecise.  But a critique of the law based on this 
premise, taken to its extreme, threatens to undermine the entire 
endeavor.  If courts defer questions of criminal responsibility and the 
definition of free will to the social sciences, they essentially abdicate a 
 
 292 See id. at 414-21. 
 293 Id. at 415. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Allen et al., supra note 277, at 415-16. 
 296 Id. at 418. 
 297 Id. at 417. 
 298 Id. at 418. 
 299 Id. at 418-19. 
 2003 THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 297 
valuable role in generating the meaning of those terms over time.300 
Allen proceeds to argue that given his understanding of 
entrapment, courts should also apply the doctrine when it is a private 
individual rather than the state that employs “extra-market” 
inducements to lure someone into committing a crime.301  Courts 
throughout the century have rejected this notion and again, it simply 
defies commonsense.  Entrapment is not a private law concept.  To 
the contrary, it appeared when it did because private law models 
could not comprehend individual freedom with respect to the 
modern state.  The government could no longer pretend to be a 
neutral arbiter between individuals, and entrapment served to 
redefine freedom and criminal responsibility in the face of this 
changed reality.  As such, applying the defense to private actors 
would be a radical and unwarranted departure from the history of 
entrapment. 
CONCLUSION 
Entrapment emerged at the turn of the century as a new way of 
policing the boundary between the government and the individual.  
As law enforcement’s control over information and intelligence 
magnified, courts acknowledged the defense.  They did so because 
freedom no longer seemed natural or inevitable in light of the 
governments newfound power.  While both the objective and 
subjective tests are sloppy, the idea of predisposition involved in the 
subjective test is the most reasonable way for courts to determine how 
much control the defendant had over his own actions and thus, 
whether he ought to be held responsible.  This may require the fact 
finder to resort to his own experience writ large, to what sort of 
inducements seem unfair, and to some approximation of what kind 
of inducements would lead most normal people to commit crimes.  
Judges and juries do this anyway.  While Allen and Seidman’s analyses 
reveal the futility of searching for origins of subjective intent, their 
critiques echo those of the progressive legal thinkers a century ago.  
Law in the post-Realist world has in many ways conceded to those 
sorts of criticisms by focusing largely on objective tests. Entrapment 
resisted the general trend.  In so doing, is one of the arenas of legal 
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doctrine that has preserved a role for courts in redefining 
individuality and freedom in the face of the radically changed nature 
of both state and federal government.  While it can be useful to 
expose myths in the law, it is not always necessary to discard them.  
Asking whether the government created the criminal and whether 
the accused was predisposed to commit the crime integrates into the 
law a general notion that the government’s monopoly over 
intelligence and information can undermine free will, and that it is 
the court’s role to preserve and protect it. 
As Susanna Blumenthal argues in her article on the creative role 
of the American judiciary, “[a]lthough the American concept of the 
rule of law may entail the suppression of judicial subjectivity, it seems 
also to require an exponent in the form of the human judge.”302  This 
irony is difficult for some commentators to comprehend.  Thus, they 
seek to purge the doctrine of its subjective component.  
Entrapment’s stubborn resistance to this trend, however, reflects an 
understandable need to believe in the rule of law, or more 
particularly the role of criminal law in punishing only those who are 
in some personal sense responsible for their actions.  At once 
invoking and critiquing Jerome Frank, Blumenthal concludes, that 
the fact we continue to trust the “finite figure” of the judge “with a 
task of such magnitude suggests that he cannot simply be viewed as a 
romantic survival.  He expresses what is perhaps a more fundamental 
and unyielding human impulse to see beyond ourselves.”303  Similarly, 
the subjective test for entrapment is not just a remnant of a more 
innocent time.  While it is true that judges and juries will inject the 
notion of predisposition with all sorts of their own perceptions, that 
fact alone does not necessarily counsel against the perpetuation of 
the concept.  By withstanding the trend toward the objective, the 
history of entrapment illustrates that pockets of the law remain myths 
that we, as a community, need to believe in.  The myth of 
predisposition, or the unattainable goal of figuring out when the 
government has created a criminal, is not silly at all.  It may be 
impossible to ascertain with any precision, but it reflects a willingness 
and desire to believe that our laws are more than just social science 
applied mechanistically to human interaction.  The subjective test in 
this particular area of the law preserves a certain distinct and useful 
role for the courts in defining freedom and autonomy.304  It is part of 
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an evolving understanding, created through time by judges and 
juries—of what it means to be a free individual in the midst of a 
growingly diffuse state. 
Even if we accept that in some form the subjective test is here to 
stay, more recent analyses have struggled to make sense of the 
Supreme Court’s definition of “predisposition.”305  In Jacobson v. 
United States,306 the jury found the defendant guilty of violating a 
statutory prohibition against knowingly receiving child pornography 
in the mail.307  The jury rejected Jacobson’s entrapment defense and 
the circuit court affirmed, finding that the government had proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was predisposed to commit the 
crime.308  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Jacobson was 
entrapped as a matter of law.309  Seemingly adhering to the subjective 
test, the Court insisted that the predisposition analysis is distinct from 
the nature of the government’s conduct.  Accordingly, the Court 
focused on whether Jacobson was predisposed to violate the law 
before government officials intervened.310 
Government agents got Jacobson’s name from a list of people 
who had received magazines depicting nude teenage boys before 
Congress criminalized such conduct.  After Congress passed the 
statute three months later, two separate government agencies 
coordinated a campaign to tempt the defendant into violating the 
law.311  After resisting various solicitations over the course of two years, 
Jacobson gave in and ordered a child-pornography magazine from a 
fictitious organization invented by the government.312  The Court 
admitted that Jacobson was predisposed to commit the crime 
immediately before he purchased the illicit material but noted that 
the critical inquiry was whether he was equally disposed before the 
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government entangled itself in his life two years before.313  Ruling that 
a defendant must be predisposed prior to any government 
involvement, the Court found the pre-investigation evidence 
wanting.314 
In the wake of this decision, circuit courts have disagreed over 
whether Jacobson redefined entrapment to include an objective test 
for predisposition.315  In United States v. Hollingsworth,316 an opinion 
authored by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that someone is 
predisposed to commit a crime if he would have committed it without 
government interference.317  Judge Posner argued that Jacobson put a 
new objective spin on the predisposition analysis, directing us to 
examine the defendant’s objective circumstances to ascertain 
whether he would have refrained from committing a crime “but for” 
the government’s meddling.318  In other words, if ample opportunity 
to commit the crime would have arisen anyway, then the fact that the 
government provided an additional incentive might not matter.  The 
First Circuit disagreed.319  It held that someone is predisposed if he 
would have committed the crime given an “ordinary opportunity.”320 
In a recent analysis, James Ponsoldt and Stephen Marsh argue 
persuasively that the objective element in the Seventh Circuit test is 
simply unwarranted by Jacobson.321  Thus, they conclude that “nothing 
in the Court’s opinion . . . endorses the notion that a person willing 
but unlikely to commit a crime is the sort of ‘law-abiding citizen’ for 
whom an entrapment defense should be available.”322  While the 
Court’s recent entrapment case lends some support for paying 
increased attention to the nature of the government’s offensive (an 
objective component), it is perfectly consistent with the early history 
of entrapment law because it focuses entirely on the defendant’s state 
of mind.  Any evidence of exactly what the government did is relevant 
 
 313 Id. at 549. 
 314 Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550-51. 
 315 Compare United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 1997), and United 
States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), with United 
States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997), and United States v. 
Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 316 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 317 Id. at 1200. 
 318 Id. at 1200.  Paul Marcus, one of the leading legal authorities on entrapment 
offered an interpretation of Jacobson similar to Posner’s.  See Marcus, supra note 277, 
at 225-27. 
 319 Id. at 1199. 
 320 Gendron, 18 F.3d at 962. 
 321 Ponsoldt & Marsh, supra note 275, at 1217-29. 
 322 Id. at 1225. 
 2003 THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 301 
only insofar as it helps us approximate that subjective state. 
The First Circuit proffers a test that provides a perfect balance.  
The test resembles a version of Allen’s market analysis stripped of its 
sterile language.  In United States v. Gendron, Judge Breyer ruled that if 
a defendant would have committed the crime given an “’ordinary 
opportunity,’” or an inducement that could not be categorized as 
improper, then he is predisposed.323  In thinking about 
predisposition, the jury and the judge will have no choice but to 
question what one would do if presented with an ordinary 
opportunity324  As Ponsoldt and Marsh put it, 
[t]he Government’s conduct has a bearing in assessing the 
probative value of the defendant’s reluctance in relation to the 
Government’s solicitation.  In answering the ultimate question . . . 
however, the court (or jury) will have to “assume away” the 
Government’s conduct and ask how the defendant would have 
responded had that conduct not been present.325 
By asking whether the defendant would have committed the crime 
given an ordinary opportunity, Gendron factors in the calculus of 
whether the government’s conduct was particularly egregious.326  
However, the primary purpose of the test remains to determine the 
defendant’s subjective state of mind: Was he willing, rather than was 
he likely, to have committed the crime anyway? 
Not surprisingly, Judge Posner cannot help but reveal an ulterior 
motive for his reading of Jacobson.327  In Hollingsworth, he remarks that 
the “but-for” causation test for predisposition produces the most 
socially productive result.328  Like Allen, Posner’s economic analysis 
favors an objective test.  Forced to work within the confines of 
stubborn Supreme Court precedent, he thinly disguises the wolf in 
sheep’s clothing.  As I argued above, the entrapment defense 
emerged not to supplement the growing reliance on social science 
and public policy but to resist the trend.  Muddling over the 
subjective state of mind preserves a creative role for the judiciary in 
developing definitions of freedom and human responsibility.329  In 
 
 323 Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961.  Judge Breyer recognized that in order to qualify as an 
improper inducement, the government would have to do something besides merely 
provide the opportunity to commit a crime.  Thus, an “ordinary opportunity” means 
a government-sponsored opportunity without excessive additional pressure.  Id. 
 324 Id. at 962. 
 325 Ponsoldt & Marsh, supra note 275, at 1231. 
 326 Gendron, 18 F.3d at 962. 
 327 Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1199-1200. 
 328 Id. at 1203. 
 329 See Blumenthal, supra note 160, at 154-56.  It is not the purpose of this essay to 
provide a comprehensive critique of law and economics.  On the other hand, I am 
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order to continue to do so, it seems fair to recognize the difficulty of 
discerning a defendant’s state of mind prior to the government’s 
enforcement efforts, but it would be an error to transform the 
purpose of the defense by resorting to law and economics or policy 
decisions and replacing the subjective with an objective analysis. 
The concept of entrapment emerged when it did because law 
enforcement outgrew its traditional status, and, perhaps, the defense 
needs to flex and change with a new breed of national intelligence, 
which has elaborate new tools at its fingertips.  Efforts to trap 
individuals using modern technology like the Internet should force 
us to rethink entrapment and to redefine what constitutes 
predisposition, but it should not change the skeleton of the defense.  
Judge Posner quite artfully tries to do what Seidman considered 
inevitable.  He wraps what is in essence an objective test in a 
subjective package.  In the process he distorts United States Supreme 
Court precedent and betrays nearly a century of evolving doctrine. 
Judge Breyer, to the contrary, has intuited a better way to allow 
entrapment to evolve in response to the changing nature of law 
enforcement without altering the fundamental purpose of the 
defense.  The goal of preserving doctrinal room for courts to define 
individuality and freedom may seem antiquated in our post-Realist 
world.  It is a myth, however, which has persisted. This myth should 
continue to weave its way, because we, as a community, need to 
believe in it. 
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